Online banking Scam
1 Overview
Not all people that send undesirable email (spam) are the same. Their motives differ as greatly as their tools and technical abilities. This document uncovers a spam gang who seeks to acquire your banking information, and the response from one of the targeted victims: Citibank.
This document describes the unique bulk-mailing tool used for recent rash of financial email scams. These scams target financial entities such as Citibank, Wells Fargo, Halifax Bank, eBay, and Yahoo. Only one specific spam gang uses this tool for these financial scams. This spam gang started slow with only a few members, but has increased in both gang membership and spam volume.
All emails and headers are provided unmodified with the following exception: all personal information has been modified to protect the identity of the recipient. These modifications are denoted with bold and underlined typeset. Every effort has been made to retain the same data format without disclosing personal information. For data taken from the public domain, such as newsgroup postings and messages from open forums, no effort has been made to modify the data or protect the publicly disclosed recipient.
2 The Citibank Scam
With the growth of online banking comes online fraud. These schemes vary from web sites that "look" like the actual financial institution to email asking for personal banking information. At first glance, the email below (Fig. 1) looks like just another one of these simple bank fraud schemes.
Figure 1: Sample Citibank Scam
Received: from host70-72.pool80117.interbusiness.it ([80.117.72.70])
by mailserver with SMTP
id <20030929021659s1200646q1e>; Mon, 29 Sep 2003 02:17:00 +0000
Received: from sharif.edu [83.104.131.38] by host70-72.pool80117.interbusiness.it (Postfix) with
ESMTP id EAC74E21484B for <e-response@securescience.net>; Mon, 29 Sep 2003 11:15:38 +0000
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 11:15:38 +0000
From: Verify <verify@citibank.com>
Subject: Citibank E-mail Verification: e-response@securescience.net
To: E-Response <e-response@securescience.net>
References: <F5B12412EAC2131E@securescience.net>
In-Reply-To: <F5B12412EAC2131E@securescience.net>
Message-ID: <EC2B7431BE0A6F48@citibank.com>
Reply-To: Verify <verify@citibank.com>
Sender: Verify <verify@citibank.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Dear Citibank Member,
This email was sent by the Citibank server to verify your e-mail
address. You must complete this process by clicking on the link
below and entering in the small window your Citibank ATM/Debit
Card number and PIN that you use on ATM.
This is done for your protection -t- becaurse some of
our members no longer have access to their email addresses and
we must verify it.
To verify your e-mail address and access your bank account,
click on the link below. If nothing happens when you click on the
link (or if you use AOL)K, copy and paste the link into
the address bar of your web browser.
http://www.citibank.com:ac=piUq3027qcHw003nfuJ2@sd96V.pIsEm.NeT/3/?3X6CMW2I2uPOVQW
y———————————————
Thank you for using Citibank!
C———————————————
This automatic email sent to: e-response@securescience.net
Do not reply to this email.
R_CODE: ulG1115mkdC54cbJT469
At a quick glance, this email appears to be from Citibank, as it contains a Citibank URL. But a closer inspection indicates a financial scam:
* The email contains multiple misspellings and grammatical errors, such as "becaurse" and "This automatic email sent to:".
* The content contains hash-busters (unique characters in the contents that are used to bypass hash-based spam filters). For example, the "-t-" and "K" in the main paragraphs, and the "y" and "C" before the long lines of hyphens. Different recipients received the message with different hash-buster characters.
* Although the included URL begins with "www.citibank.com", it actually goes to "sd96v.pisem.net" [ref 1]. This server is hosted in
* The email header does not originate from Citibank. Instead, it originated from a DSL system in
People who clicked on the link saw the Citibank web page and a popup that prompts for login information (Fig. 2, Fig. 3). Although the Citibank web page actually came from Citibank, the popup came from a non-Citibank server. Victims that entered banking information in the popup essentially gave their accounts to an unknown scam artist.
Fig. 2 Trojan login popup from 29-Sep-2003.
Figure 2: Trojan login popup from 29-Sep-2003.[ref 2]
Fig. 3 Reply screen after entering login information.
Figure 3: Reply screen after entering login information.
2.1 Mass Mailing Revisions
The 29-Sep-2003 mass mailing (Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3) is actually the second revision of the fraudulent bank emails. The first revision appeared on 16-Aug-2003 and asked the recipient to view new banking terms and conditions. Users who clicked on the link were redirected to a server in
In nearly every case, a Russian server was used, either to host the requests, or to act as a web-bug and count the number of hits. For example, the web bug from the first revision can be found here. According to this web-log, there were 107,274 hits on 16-Aug-2003, and 91,573 hits on 17-Aug-2003 (Fig. 5). These were primarily due to responses to the first spam message. In contrast, the day before the mass mailing, there was only one web-log entry, from "68.82.62.191″ – a cable modem in
Figure 4: The third revision of the Citibank trojan login, from 25-Oct-2003. A server in
Figure 5: Number of daily web hits recorded by the Russian web bug from the 16-Aug-2003 Citibank mailing.
Figure 6: IP addresses from the week preceding the 16-Aug-2003 mailing. A
